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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In less than a decade after the debt crisis of 1982, developing countries have 
experienced a surge of capital inflows in recent years. This trend became more 
pronounced in the 1990s resulting in overall balance of payments surpluses and 
accumulation of reserves. Total private capital inflows to developing countries 
exceeded $173 billion in 1994, compared to annual average inflows of $34 billion 
during 1983–90 [World Bank (1995)]. Although the characteristics of capital 
inflows in this episode are different than in the period prior to the last debt crisis, 
nevertheless concerns about macroeconomic stability, loss in competitiveness, 
financial sector vulnerability and excessive borrowing remain the same. 
While the rise in inflows during 1991–93 was supported in part by low 
interest rates and weak economic activity in industrial countries, improved economic 
policies and prospects in most recipient countries also played an important role. The 
larger share in inflows of those countries that achieved greater progress in economic 
reforms, is evidence of the importance of recipient country policies. During this 
period, the composition of private flows to developing countries also became more 
diversified. Foreign direct investment (FDI) accounted for 45 percent of total equity 
inflows in 1994, with debt accounting for 32 percent and portfolio flows accounting 
for the remaining 23 percent. 
According to a recent assessment [World Bank (1995)], overall private capital 
flows to developing countries are likely to continue to increase in the medium term, 
though at a much slower pace than in the early 1990s, growing on average at about 
7–10 percent annually. Many countries are at the limit of prudential borrowing, so at 
most their net liabilities can rise in line with exports. However, within this overall 
trend, some economies in Asia and several transitional economies are likely to see a 
larger increase. 
Pakistan has experienced substantial private capital inflows throughout the 
1980s. Most of these inflows were in the form of workers’ remittances and to a 
lesser extent, private short-term and some medium-term capital inflows recorded in 
the capital account. However, it was only in 1993-94, that private capital inflows 
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grew substantially, totalling almost $ 4.5 billion, in 1994-95, and producing 
surpluses on the overall balance of payments in both 1993-94 and 1994-95 which 
contributed to a rapid accumulation of reserves. While Pakistan experienced the 
“inflow phenomenon” later than many developing countries in Latin America and 
Asia, regional trends in capital flows and Pakistan’s continued commitment to 
reforms promises further inflows in the coming years. 
The experience of developing countries that received large inflows suggests 
that the initial promise of capital inflows was positive. Inflows eased external 
financing constraints and held the potential for higher investment and growth. 
However, as capital inflows became large, they threatened macroeconomic stability 
by contributing to an acceleration in domestic demand and activity, feeding 
developments that signalled overheating. With significant variations in experiences 
of countries, these signals included a widening of the external current account 
deficit, higher consumption financed by inflows, weaker monetary control and rising 
inflation, real exchange rate appreciation and vulnerability to reversal of inflows. 
The reasons for differences in the experiences of countries were mainly 
rooted in the causes of the inflows and the policy responses adopted by governments 
[Carkovic et al. (1993)]. One cause of inflows was changes in real domestic 
economic policies including structural changes that improved potential productivity, 
or reduction in fiscal deficits promising greater macroeconomic stability. Inflows 
also occurred as a result of tightening domestic credit policies or an increase in 
administered interest rates. External influences contributed to inflows significantly 
especially lower foreign interest rates and recession abroad. And in some cases, 
inflows were caused by band-wagon effects, which may have reflected over-reaction 
of financial markets to new information or the pursuit of current trends. 
Whatever the causes of inflows, policy-makers have taken offsetting policy 
actions, seeking to accommodate higher investment and growth afforded by the 
inflows while trying to insulate their economies from their destabilising effects. This 
is the challenge facing policy-makers in Pakistan as well. After analysing various 
forms of private capital inflows to Pakistan this paper presents the existing evidence 
on their causes and stability. There is a review of the possible effects of inflows on 
the financial sector and potential impact of the planned privatisation and energy 
investment programme. The paper ends with a discussion of various policy options 
available to increase the impact of inflows on investment and growth, while limiting 
its destabilising influence. 
 
II.  RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND REFORMS 
Pakistan embarked on a comprehensive programme of macroeconomic 
adjustment and reform in 1988-89. In the ensuing period, Pakistan achieved 
significant progress in efforts to: (i) liberalise the exchange and trade system; (ii)  
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reform the financial sector; (iii) liberalised domestic and foreign investment 
activities; (iv) initiate a wide ranging privatisation programme and open up areas of 
the economy previously reserved for the public sector. The beneficial impact of the 
structural reform was reflected in strong GDP and export growth, improvement in 
the structure of output, higher domestic and foreign direct investment. However 
demand management remained weak as a result of insufficient fiscal retrenchment. 
During 1993-94–1994-95, after a year of political uncertainty and poor economic 
performance, efforts have been made to revitalise the economy. The real GDP 
growth rate has gradually picked up from 2.3 percent during the through in 1992-93 
to 4.7 percent in 1994-95 (Table 1). The fiscal deficit is being gradually brought 
under control and monetary expansion slowly restrained. This, partly due to surge in 
capital inflows during the last two years which have contributed to a rapid 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Table 1 
Pakistan—Main Economic Indicators 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Read GDP Growth Rate (Percent) 5.6 7.7 2.3 3.8 4.7 
Investment/GNP (Percent) 18.5 19.9 20.6 19.4 19.1 
National Savings/GNP (Percent) 13.9 16.9 13.5 15.6 14.9 
CPI (Percent Change) 12.7 9.6 9.3 11.2 12.9 
Federal Budget Deficit (Percent of GDP)µ 8.7 7.4 7.9 5.8 5.5 
Broad Money M2 (Percent Change) 16.3 30.3 18.0 16.9 16.6 
Current Account Deficit (Percent of GDP) –3.1 –2.1 –6.4 –3.3 –3.5 












Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Recent developments in the balance of payments have reflected in large 
measure the structural reform programme that Pakistan has been implementing since 
1988-89 (Table 2). Specifically, the programme has fostered the growth of 
merchandise exports, the liberalisation of imports of goods and services, and 
encouragement of private capital inflows of foreign direct and portfolio investment. 
These inflows have bolstered the declining trends in traditional forms of capital 
inflows through workers remittances and non-resident foreign currency deposits. 
The current account deficit as percent of GDP, gradually decreased from a 
steady 3.4 percent during the late 1980s to 2.1 percent in 1991-92 before rising 
sharply in 1992-93  reflecting policy shippages and then falling to 3.5 percent of 
GDP in 1994-95. The current account deficit was partly financed by a surplus  on the  
 
Table 2 
Pakistan—Balance of Payments (in Millions of U. S. Dollars) 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95P 
Trade Balance –2483 –2236 –3267 –2038 –2253 
Exports Fob 5902 6762 6782 6685 7884 
Imports Fob –8385 –8998 –10049 –8723 –10137 
Service Balance –1790 –2225 –2748 –2372 –2546 
Trade and Service Balance –4273 –4461 –6015 4410 –4799 
Private Transfers 2292 2961 2327 2390 2397 
O/W:  Workers’ Remittances 1848 1468 1562 1446 1866 
Resident FCA 190 1318 543 752 381 
Official Transfer (Net) 604 441 357 314 312 
Current Account Balance –1377 –905 –3331 –1706 –2090 
Capital Account 1447 1205 2708 3150 2395 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed 1291 363 1554 1138 582 
Medium and Long-term 607 766 815 926 1162 
Project and Non-project Aid 758 966 846 804 850 
Commercial Banks and IDB –151 –165 –42 132 201 
FCBCs 5 Years, Eurobonds  21 66 32 183 
Other  –56 –55 –42 –72 
Short-term 684 –403 739 212 –580 
Commercial Banks and IDB 208 –133 315 288 –40 
FEBCs and DBCs 93 32 67 18 8 
Other 383 –302 357 –94 –548 
Private Sector, Total 156 842 1154 2012 1867 
Private Non-bank 448 1109 836 1676 2079 
Medium and Long-term 278 1134 1229 1425 1929 
Direct Investment 246 335 306 304 354 
Portfolio Invest. (Excldg. FEBC, DBC, FCBC) –9 219 137 289 1069 
Private Unguaranteed (Suppliers Credit) 34 559 503 366 464 
Other Non-bank 7 21 283 416 42 
Short-term Non-bank 170 –25 –393 251 150 
Deposit Money Banks –292 –267 318 336 –266 
Medium- and Long-term 3 –5 1 –3       – 
FCDs 286 –61 62 413 –94 
Other Short-term –581 –201 255 –74 –172 
Errors and Omissions –73 –25 30 147 –64 
Overall Balance –24 130 –589 1585 –242 
Financing 24 –130 589 –1585 –242 
Net Int. Reserves (Increase –) 114 –352 512 –1882 –342 
State Bank of Pakistan 71 –431 613 –1788 – 
Deposit Money Banks 43 79 –101 94 – 
Use of Fund Credit –120 222 77 297 100 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
 P = Provisional.  
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capital account which fluctuated between 3-4 percent of GDP during 1988–1992. 
Reflecting large private capital inflows, the capital account surplus rose sharply to 
6.4 percent of GDP in 1993-94. The overall balance of payments showed large 
surpluses in 1993-94 and 1994-95; as a result, international reserves of the State 
Bank rose by about $ 2.2 billion in the last two years. 
Considerable progress has been made in the implementation of structural 
reforms specially with regard to trade and payments liberalisation. Pakistan has 
achieved full convertibility of the rupee on current account transactions. 
The financial sector, has undergone significant structural changes since 1989-
90, aiming to improve mobilisation and allocation of loanable funds within the 
formal sector. Measures initially adopted included the institution of a mechanism for 
auctioning government debt, raising rates of return on concessional lending, limiting 
mandatory lending and credit from the SBP to nonbank financial institutions, 
strengthening SBP’s supervisory and regulatory role, and enhancing the balance  
sheets of nationalised commercial banks (NCBs). 
In 1991-92 the Pakistan authorities intensified the financial sector reform 
programme. The objectives of the intensification were to strengthen financial 
intermediation through steps to rationalise the structure of rates of return on a wide 
range of public debt instruments, to move toward indirect monetary control, to 
reduce the distortionary effects of mandatory and concessional credit allocation, to 
strengthen the financial system through enhanced supervision and regulation, and to 
encourage private sector participation in domestic banking and financial services. 
The centrepiece of the Government’s programme to rationalise the rate 
structure on public debt instruments and to move toward indirect monetary control, 
has been the implementation of an auction programme for government securities 
which began in March 1991. 
Privatisation of banking activity has been an important component of the 
authorities’ financial sector reform programme. It is motivated by the intention to 
increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the banking system. Prior to the 
reform programme, state-owned NCBs dominated domestic banking activity. Since 
their nationalisation in 1974, the NCBs had generally not operated on commercial 
principles, with the result that their efficiency, market responsiveness, and financial 
strength were adversely affected. Consequently, the government has sought private 
sector participation in domestic banking through the privatisation of NCBs and the 
establishment of new privately owned banks. 
In January 1992, the SBP issued new prudential regulations—in order to 
enhance the supervision and regulation of the banking system. The new guidelines 
include more stringent limits on credit concentration and on contingent liabilities; 
stiffer guidelines on the separation of bank ownership and management; tighter 
margin requirements on equity-based advances; and a strengthened system of  
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classification and provisioning for nonperforming assets. In addition, amendments 
were made to the Banks’ Nationalisation Act of 1974 aimed at enhancing the 
administrative and advisory role of the Pakistan Banking Council in commercial 
banking. 
In 1993, through an amendment in the State Bank Act, 1956, the State Bank 
of Pakistan has been given operational independence to conduct monetary policy and 
regulate and supervise the banking sector. 
In 1994-95, the government continued efforts to move towards the adoption 
of indirect instruments of monetary control and took measures to liberalise interest 
rates further. 
 
III.  PAKISTAN: CHARACTERISTICS AND STABILITY 
OF CAPITAL INFLOWS TO PAKISTAN 
The timing, persistence and size of various forms of capital inflows into 
Pakistan reflect the special circumstances and domestic policies that had a bearing on 
these inflows. Traditionally workers’ remittances have been the main form of inflows 
reflecting the immigration of Pakistan labour to the Middle East region during the oil 
price boom of the 1970s. Later with the liberalisation of capital controls and structural 
reforms in trade and the financial sector, capital inflows also appeared in the forms of 
foreign currency deposits, and portfolio and direct investment. 
Pakistan also experienced the impact of the region wide capital inflow 
phenomenon as a consequence of its economic reforms although in more recent 
months there has been a substantial outflow. Partly as a result of the timing of reform 
of domestic policies, the allocation of international private capital flows towards 
South Asian countries became significant in the early 1990s. The recent increase in 
non-traditional capital inflows (FDI and portfolio inflows) are partly a reflection of 
investors perceptions of Pakistan’s share of regional capital. Investor perceptions of 
prudential allocation towards Pakistan are sensitive to economic and political 
considerations in Pakistan and other countries in the region which compete for a 
limited pool of investible resources. Unless there is a change in domestic policies, 
inflows to Pakistan are likely to be influenced by regional trends in South Asia as 
well as its unique factors. 
 
Workers’ Remittances 
During 1972-73–1994-95, nearly $ 37 billion in workers’ remittances entered 
Pakistan financing about 82 percent of the cumulative merchandise trade deficit over 
the same period. Annually, remittances grew steadily to a peak of $2.9 billion in 
1982-83 before declining along a trend to $1.5 billion in 1993-94 and $1.8 billion in 
1994-95  (Table 3).  In 1994-95,  remittances  were 44 percent of the current account  
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Table 3 
Pakistan—Private Capital Flows (in Millions of U. S. Dollars) 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Workers’ Remittances 1848 1488 1562 1446 1866 
Resident FCA 190 1318 543 752 381 
Private Non-bank 448 1109 836 1676 2079 
Direct Investment 246 335 306 354 354 
Portfolio Investment –9 219 137 289 1069 
Private Unguaranteed (Suppliers Credit) 34 559 503 366 464 
Other Non-bank 7 21 283 416 42 
Short-term Non-bank 170 –25 –393 251 150 
Deposit Money Banks –292 –267 318 336 –266 
Medium and Long-term 3 –5 1 –3 – 
FCDs Non-resident 286 –61 62 413 –94 
Other Short-term –581 –201 255 –74 –172 
Publicly Guaranteed 150 –245 406 470 352 
FCBCs, 5-years, Eurobonds – 21 66 32 183 
FEBCs, DBCs 93 32 67 18 8 
Commercial Banks and IDB 











 (Short-term) 208 –133 315 288 –40 
Total Private Capital Inflows 2344 3383 3665 4480 4412 
Current Account Deficit1 3435 3836 5431 3904 4337 
Overall Balance of Payments –24 130 –589 1585 242 
GDP 45064 50000 51969 51697 59763 
Inflows as Percent of Current Account 68.2 88.2 67.5 114.7 101.7 
as Percent of GDP 5.2 6.8 7.1 8.7 7.4 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
1Current deficit excluding workers’ remittances and resident FCAs. 
 
deficit and amounted to 3 percent of GDP. Currently about three-fourths of 
remittances originate in the Middle-East while the rest come from OECD countries 
[Economic Survey (1994-95)]. Following the deregulation of resident foreign 
currency accounts in 1991, some remittances are now flowing into these accounts. 
Two basic approaches have been tested in the literature to identify the 
determinants of workers’ remittances. One approach treats remittances like other 
capital movements and considers the ‘portfolio choice’ by the immigrant worker 
focusing on cross border return differentials, comparative asset characteristics (risk, 
liquidity, taxes) and institutional factor (capital controls, financial regulation etc.). 
The alternative approach links migration, earnings abroad and remittances. The 
model in [Karim (1994)] tests the impact on remittances of various factors like the 
number of migrant workers, expected length of stay, host per capita income, home 
per capita income, home-host interest rate differential and institutional factors. Using 
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monthly dollar value of remittances, the model is estimated over the period July 
1983 to June 1992. Dummies were introduced to reflect the introduction of resident 
foreign currency deposits in 1991, the Gulf war and the oil price crash of 1986. 
Estimates suggests that in the case of Pakistan, remittances are primarily 
determined by the basic demographic (number of workers) and income variables (in 
workers’ host countries) which are inherently relatively stable compared to portfolio 
considerations which have a smaller impact on remittances [Karim (1994)]. 
Remittances to Pakistan were also significantly affected by the oil price crash of 
1986 and the introduction of resident foreign currency accounts in 1991; the latter 
allowed workers’ to retain savings without the exchange rate risk and made portfolio 
considerations more important. This evidence together with the fact that Pakistani 
migrant workers are spread across a number of countries and involved in numerous 
professions, suggests a continuation of remittance inflows along existing stable 
trends especially in light of expected stable growth prospects in the Middle East and 
OECD countries [IMF (1994)]. 
 
Portfolio Inflows 
The term portfolio flow refers to the flow of funds resulting from a country’s 
access to international financial markets and also to the flow resulting from activities 
of international investors in domestic financial markets. 
Portfolio investment flows into Pakistan are best understood in the context of 
changes in the structure of international capital flows. External financing for 
developing countries from bank sources has declined in importance during the last 
decade. Foreign portfolio investment (external funds raised as equity or debt in 
international markets) has played a major role in the shift towards non-bank 
financing. Prospects for high economic growth rates in developing countries, usually 
reflected in higher returns on portfolio investment, is one of the major reasons for 
increased portfolio flows to emerging markets. 
 
Portfolio Debt Flows 
The shift towards portfolio investment has been mostly on account of debt 
flows. A variety of debt instruments have been used by developing countries. 
Pakistan has participated in the external financial markets for sometime now but 
mainly with public instruments and by offering foreign currency deposits [Kwang 
(1990)]. Publicly guaranteed instruments include foreign exchange bearer 
certificates (FEBCs) issued by the Federal Government in exchange for foreign 
currency deposits (introduced in the early 1980s) and dollar bearer certificates 
(DBCs) of 1 year maturity, offered a return of a fraction above LIBOR; DBCs are no 
longer issued since November 1994. Although FEBCs are available in a range of a  
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maturities upto 6 year, because of the poor yields offered, inflows on account of 
FEBCs and DBCs over the last five years have been mostly of short-term maturity. 
These inflows add to $ 218 million during the period (Table 4). These instruments 
were aimed at both residents and non-residents but the maturity of mobilised funds 
was not suitable for financing longer-term development requirements. To meet this 
deficiency, Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates (FCBCs) were introduced in March 
1992 with the aim of improving the term structure of foreign currency liabilities. 
FCBCs carry a five-year maturity and are issued at par in US dollars, deutsche 
marks, pound sterling and yen. FCBCs bear fixed rates of return set by the State 
Bank with a 2.5 percent margin over the yields on bonds in respective currencies 
FCBCs can be encashed after a minimum holding period of two years; a fee of 1.5 
percent per annum is charged for the unexpired period. After a slow start capital 





(in Million of US Dollars) 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95P 
Public Sector 684 –403 739 214 50  
Commercial Banks 206 –137 225 310 – 
IDB 2 4 90 20 – 
FEBCs and DBCs 93 32 67 18 50 
Other 383 –302 357 –94 – 
Private Sector –125 –287 –76 590 67 
Non–bank(Ebills. 
Non–resident FCDs) 170 –25 –393 251 100 
Deposits Money Banks –295 –262 317 339 –33 
FCDs(16.5) 286 –61 62 413 100 
Other –581 –201 255 –74 –133 
Total 264 –952 980 1143 83 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
 P= Provisional . 
 
Although Pakistan has been able to access external financial markets through 
internal instruments, (deposits and short and medium term certificates), access 
through external instruments has been limited because of investors’ concerns over 
the country’s creditworthiness. Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. has been the first company 
to float Eurodollar Convertible Bonds worth $ 35 million in the international market. 
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New issues have been discouraged by the rise in international interest rates 
[Economic Survey 1994-95)]. For the first time, the Government of Pakistan floated 
Sovereign Bonds in the Eurodollar Market worth $ 150 million with a five year 
maturity at 385 basis points above the US Treasury Bond rate. Following down 
grading of Pakistan’s credit rating by Moody’s from Ba3 to B1 in July 1995, the cost 
of borrowing has risen to over 700 basis points over the US Treasury Bond rate. 
 
Portfolio Equity Flows 
Portfolio equity flows to developing countries grew from insignificant 
amounts in early 1980s to about $ 40 billion in 1994, with the major shares going to 
Latin America and East Asian and Pacific region [World Bank (1995)]. These equity 
flows include America Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts 
(GDRs)1 issued on international markets, investment in country or regional funds 
and direct equity purchases on the stock markets by foreign investors. 
Pakistan was among the first countries in emerging markets to take measures 
to open up stock markets to international investors. However, in relation to the total 
flows directed to developing countries, interest in Pakistan has been very modest. 
Direct equity purchases by foreigners are not monitored by Pakistan and there is no 
systematic collection of statistics for such flows because these pass through several 
different channels and are hard to estimate. In the absence of systematic data on the 
magnitude of direct portfolio investment, it is estimated that about $ 700 million 
were invested by foreign investors at end 1994, which was 5 percent of total market 
capitalisation (Table 5). GDRs issued by Pakistani corporations include Pakistan 
Telecom $ 898 million; HUBCO $ 175 million; and Chakwal Cement $ 100 million. 
Box 1 
FCAs and FEBCs 
Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs can be opened by resident (RFCDs) and non-resident 
(NRFCDs) nationals. The scheme is also open to foreign nationals residing abroad and diplomatic 
missions etc. Interest rates payable are capped at fractions of a percent above LIBOR, varying with 
maturity. These accounts are exempt from wealth tax, zakat, source disclosure and all foreign exchange 
control restrictions. These accounts can be held in US dollars, Yen, D. Mark and Pound Steling. 
Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificates (FEBCs) are publicly guaranteed debt instruments issued by 
the Federal Government in exchange for foreign currency deposits. FEBCs are available in a range of 
maturities upto 6 years, at interest rates determined by the issuer (a maximum of 15 percent on 6 year 
certificates). 
Dollar Bearer Certificates (DBCs) are publicly guaranteed, issued by the Federal Government of 
one year maturity and bearing an interest rate of 0.25 percent above LIBOR. The issue of DBCs have been 
discontinued since November 1994. 
Foreign Currency Bearer Certificates (FCBCs) are publicly guaranteed, issued by the Federal 
Government, with a maturity of 5 years. Issued at par in US dollars, deutsche marks, pound sterling and 
yen, FCBCs bear interest rates that reflect a 2.5 percent margin over the respective government bond of 
same maturity. 
1ADRs and GDRs are internationally traded equity-based instruments backed by a trust, holding 
shares of domestic companies. 
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Table 5 
Pakistan—Net Inflow of Foreign Private Investment 









 1985-86 145.2 16.0 161.2 
 1986-87 108.0 21.0 129.0 
 1987-88 162.2 10.5 172.7 
 1988-89 210.2 7.2 217.4 
 1989-90 216.2 –4.7 211.5 
 1990-91 246.0 –9.0 237.0 
 1991-92 335.2 218.5 553.7 
 1992-93 306.4 136.8 443.2 
 1993-94 354.1 288.6 642.7 
 1994-95 354.2 1068.93 1423.1 
 (July–Apr) 
 1993-94 288.1 297.9 586.0 
Source:  Statistics Department. State Bank of Pakistan. 
  1Includes cash, capital equipment and reinvested profits. 
  2Excluding government securities. 
  3Includes $ 862.2 million of PTC vouchers. 
 
Country funds are an indirect channel for foreign investors to invest in equity 
markets especially when there are restrictions on foreign portfolio investment. 
Pakistan’s first country fund was set up by Citicorp in April 1991 with a 
capitalisation of $ 22.6 million listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. A number 
of country funds were set up subsequently listed in the table below. Some regional 
funds are also understood to have targeted Pakistani equities recently [Kwang 
(1990)]. 
 
Pakistan Funds Currently Operating 
   Name    Listed at    Type Capitalisation 
Pakistan Fund 
(Morgan Grenfell) 
Hong Kong Closed End $ 25 Million 
Pakistan Investment Fund 
(Morgan Stanley) 
New York Closed End $ 102 Million 
Pakistan Growth Fund 
(Credit Lyonnaise) (Domicile) 
Cayman Islands Open End $ 17 Million 
Pakistan Trust Fund 
(Jardine Fleming) 
Cayman Islands Open End $ 11 Million 
Pakistan Special Situation Fund 
(Credit Lyonnaise) 
Cayman Islands Open End $ 6 Million 
Pakistan Portfolio 
(Paribus Asset Management) 
Ireland Open End $ 2 Million 
Regent Moghul Fund 
(Regent Capital Management) 
Ireland Open End $ 33 Million 
Thornton New Tiger Pakistan 
(Thornton) 
Bermuda Open End $ 2 Million 
Source:  Emerging Market Fund Monitor. 
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Table 6 















 USA 93.9 –2.0 91.9 114.5 34.0 148.5 
 UK 22.8 –0.2 22.6  32.0 50.0  82.0 
 UAE 15.9 –2.8 13.1   7.5  2.6  10.1 
 Germany 11.2 – 11.2   9.1  3.3  12.4 
 France  6.0 –  6.0  11.1  –  11.1 
 Hong Kong  0.9 –  0.0   1.2 –19.2 –18.0 
 Italy  3.8 –  3.8   0.3  –   0.3 
 Japan 16.1 –4.2 11.9  29.7  0.8  30.5 
 Saudi Arabia 1.1  0.6  1.7  1.9   –   1.9 
Canada  0.9  0.1  1.0  1.2   8.8  10.0 
Netherlands 5.3  0.7  6.0 –0.1   0.1   0.0 
Others    39=8.3        3.1 41.4 145.7 208.2 353.9 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
  1Exculding government certificates. 
  2Consists of cash, capital equipment brought-in and reinvested earnings.   
 
After a modest beginning in international placements of equity issues, as part 
of the privatisation programme, the Pakistan Government offered 5 million Pakistan 
Telecommunications (PTC) vouchers in the international market during 1994-95 
which were fully subscribed, mobilising $ 862 million. With large public corpora-
tions being offered for sale and a second PTC issue likely soon, inflows on this 
account are likely to grow in the years ahead. 
Portfolio inflows, because of their inherently volatile nature, have proved to 
be reversible more than other forms in developing countries. Their potential 
volatility is great in Pakistan as well since portfolio investment in Pakistan is 
directed mainly towards short-term and some medium-term public debt instruments 
and the stock exchanges, while access to capital markets through the use of external 
instruments has been limited. Analysis2 of the forms of portfolio flows that are 
invested in Pakistan shows that external factors such as the secular decline in 
international interest rates, were more important in portfolio allocations towards 
Pakistani assets than domestic developments. 
2Using a portfolio choice model in Karim (1994), portfolio flows are related to LIBOR, stock 
marked index and inflation. Model performance in weak. 
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Foreign Currency Accounts 
Foreign currency accounts for non-residents were introduced in 1973 
(Annexure 1). Resident foreign currency deposits were deregulated in February 
1991. Both types of accounts are protected from disclosure requirements regarding 
source of funds. The interest rates payable on these accounts are capped at fractions 
of a percent above LIBOR, varying with maturity of deposit. The margins range 
between 3/8 percent for 3-month deposits to 15/8 percent for 3-year deposits. 
Commercial banks are required to surrender foreign exchange to the State Bank in a 
swap agreement, with the period of the swap corresponding to the initial maturity of 
these deposits. In June 1992, SBP phased out its policy of providing free full-
forward exchange cover to the financial institutions in respect of these deposits and 
introduced a fee of 3 percent per year. The fee is currently at 4.5 percent. As of April 
30, 1995, the stock of FCDs outstanding was $ 5670 million, of which $ 3300 
million were held by residents. In 1993-94, the year of peak inflows into FCDs, 
especially RFCDs, these financed nearly a quarter of the current account deficit in 
that year (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 
Pakistan—Foreign Currency Accounts 
 (in Million of US Dollars) 











1975   26.13 – 26.13 
1976   77.68 – 77.68 
1977   104.00 – 104.00 
1978   108.30 – 108.30 
1979   114.50 – 114.50 
1980   115.25 – 115.25 
1981   201.85 – 201.85 
1982   259.51 – 259.51 
1983   550.77 – 550.77 
1984   638.27 – 638.27 
1985   597.83 – 597.83 
1986   1094.82 – 1094.82 
1987 839.40 654.38 1493.78 – 1493.78 
1988 893.70 755.34 1649.04 – 1649.04 
1989 913.46 639.00 1849.46 – 1849.46 
1990 1088.46 1027.49 2115.95 – 2115.95 
1991 950.78 1251.95 2202.73 386.46 2592.19 
1992 905.74 1083.51 1989.25 1070.01 3696.26 
1993 864.45 1186.04 177.00 2227.49 2250.41 4477.90 
1994 1058.94 1404.08 457.14 2920.16 3002.44 5922.60 
End Mar 1995 1010.84 1354.96 642.01 3007.81 3254.65 6262.46 
14th June 1995 – – – 3066.30 3259.72 6362.02 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
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Although complete information on the maturity structure of FCA and FCDs is 
not available, there is evidence that most deposits are of less than 1 year maturity. 
However the maturity structure of FCDs are implicitly lengthened by the widespread 
use of these deposits as a form of collateral. Recently, these deposits, especially 
those held by residents, demonstrated their stability as they withstood the test of a 
confidence crisis during the balance of payments crisis of summer 1993. FCDs, 
because of the anonymity of source of funds, to some extent also represent the 
earnings in the grey economy. For example, deposits of Pakistanis in international 
banking centres declined after the introduction of RFCD scheme in 1991 (as seen in 
data published by IFS, IMF). As long as the rules governing these accounts do not 
change, the attraction of FCDs for this reason will remain intact. 
The stability of FCDs depends to a large extent on the motivation to hold a 
foreign currency asset. Two alternative explanations have been tested:3 FCDs 
constitute a portfolio investment, driven mainly by rate of return considerations. In 
this case a confidence crisis could result in a large capital outflow from these 
accounts. Alternatively, FCDs could be representing a more permanent variety of 
investment associated with workers’ remittances and the informal economy, in 
which case FCDs are likely to be more stable. Tests of FCD behaviour indicate that 
the share of FCDs in total money supply is not sensitive to portfolio considerations 
and resident FCDs have a strongly positive relationship to exchange rate 
depreciation expectations [Karim (1994)]. This confirms the non-portfolio nature of 
FCDs in Pakistan. The overlap between the expatriate worker population and FCD 
holders also argues for the similarity of FCDs to workers’ remittances. Resident 
FCDs constitute a channel for remittance transfer without exposure to currency risk. 
Since remittances are significantly related to long-term demographic and contractual 
income factors, resident FCDs are also likely to display similar stability. 
Box 2 
Forward Foreign Exchange Cover 
The State Bank of Pakistan provides forward cover on all FCAs deposits to commercial banks 
who are required to surrender such deposits with the State Bank. The State Bank previously also 
provided forward cover on foreign currency loans for trade finance and working capital at a fee of 10 
percent. The fiscal cost of the latter cover to the State Bank varied with the rate of devaluation of the 
rupee. Recently the State Bank has discontinued providing forward cover on such short-term foreign 
currency loans. A number of commercial banks are now providing forward cover at varying rates listed 
below. 
3Using a currency substitution regression model in Karim (1994), monthly data on FCDs was 
regressed against exchange rate expectations, rates of interest and stock adjustment variables. 
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Foreign Exchange Forward Cover Premium Charged by Commercial Banks 
(in Percent per Annum) 
 





Habib Bank AG Zurich 6.33 
ANZ Grindlays 4.36 
Bank of America 5.14 




Soneri Bank 6.90 
ABM Amro 4.92 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Foreign direct investment in Pakistan has grown at a moderate pace compared 
to the surge of other forms of inflows during the last five years. Compared to an 
average annual flow of about $157 million during 1987-88–1988-89 before the start 
of the reform process in the country, inflows during the last two years have averaged 
about $ 330 million, growing by about 18 percent annually. FDI constituted about 8 
percent of total private inflows in 1994-95, lower from its 14 percent share in 1990-
91–1991-92 (Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
Pakistan—Breakdown of Direct Foreign Investment 

















Cash Brought in 167.3 166.9 254.6 224.2 180.5 225.2 139.2 
 (77.4) (67.8) (76.0) (73.2) (51.0) (72.0) (48.3) 
Capital Equipment 14.7 27.1 19.8 14.9 96.2 34.2 83.1 
Brought in (6.8) (11.0) (5.9) (4.9) (27.2) (9.6) (28.8) 
Re-invested 34.2 52.0 60.7 67.3) 77.4) 65.0 65.8 
Earning (15.8) (21.1) (18.1) (22.0) (21.9) (18.4) (22.8) 
Total 216.2 246.0 335.1 306.4 354.1 354.2 288.1 
Source:  Statistics  Department SBP. 
1Figure in Parentheses represent percentage share in total. 
Mohammad Zubair Khan 868 
The decision-making process regarding FDI involves a choice of project as well 
as the country in which to invest. The host country must possess some locational 
advantage to attract investments. Pakistan’s policy with regard to attracting FDI 
compares well with those of other countries in the region in respect of investment 
incentives, especially tax treatment and regulations controlling repatriation of profits 
and capital. However there are continuing weaknesses in physical infrastructure and 
power supplies, shortage of educated skilled labour which erodes the low-cost 
advantage of Pakistan labour, and a poor law and order situation. 
Analysis of the determinants of FDI in Pakistan [Karim (1994)] suggests that 
macroeconomic stability and the structural reforms are the main determinants. In 
addition, investment regulations and political stability are also important [Karim 
(1994)]. 
 
IV.  EFFECTS OF CAPITAL INFLOWS ON THE 
DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The growing volume of capital inflows into Pakistan in recent years has raised 
some important issues, such as: What are the effects of capital inflows on the 
banking system and capital market? Have financial risks in Pakistan’s banking 
system increased as a result of the changes in balance sheets and asset private 
volatility brought about by rapid changes in the volume and composition of capital 
inflows? Is the existing financial infrastructure—including regulatory, supervisory, and 
accounting arrangements—capable of fostering an adequate management of these 
risks? 
The ability of Pakistan to attract and effectively intermediate a growing 
volume of financial flows depends importantly on the comprehensiveness, 
independence, and enforceability of the regulatory and supervisory framework in the 
financial sector. This framework needs to ensure: (1) that the banking system, which 
is going to remain the main conduit for the flows of funds into the country, allocates 
credit efficiently in an environment where balance sheets are expanding as a result of 
capital inflows; and (2) that the stability of the domestic capital market is not 
adversely affected by cross-border flows, and that the capital market possesses 
sufficient integrity and transparency to retain investor confidence [Liliana and 
Weisbrod (1994)]. 
 
The Impact on the Banking Sector 
In Pakistan, banking problems have been the result of poor credit decisions 
and inadequate management of credit risk, including overexposure to certain types 
of risk. The phenomenon of capital inflows in recent years have set up a systemic 
risk of relatively volatile capital flows which can contribute to these problems. The 
impact of volatile flows can be significantly adverse when bank balance sheets are 
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badly structured by causing large swings in bank liquidity resulting in alternating 
periods of credit expansion and contraction. Two major areas of concern are the 
ability of the banking system to assess, price, and manage risk, and the adequacy of 
the supervisory and regulatory frameworks to prevent and contain systemic risk, 
particularly in the presence of the problem of moral hazard. Large and volatile 
capital flows can exaggerate risk exposures and impair the ability of both banks and 
supervisors to adequately assess and manage risk. 
 
Capital Inflows and Banking Sector Exposure 
Total private capital inflows increased from $ 2.3 billion (5.2 percent of GDP) 
in 1990-91 (prior to the inflow phenomenon) to a peak of $ 4.5 billion (8.7 percent 
of GDP) in 1993-94 before subsiding somewhat to $ 4.3 billion (7.1 percent of 
GDP) in 1994-95. Inflows financed 68 percent of the current account deficit 
(excluding workers’ remittances and RFCDs) in 1990-91, and nearly 115 percent of 
the current account deficit in 1993-94. 
The evidence above suggests that workers remittances, FDI and resident 
FCDs represent considerably stable forms of inflows. The maturity structure of 
FCDs is not known currently but it is lengthened in practice by the growing practice 
to use these deposits as a form of collateral. 
The most striking feature of private capital flows into Pakistan is that 
portfolio investment, non-resident foreign currency deposits and other short-term 
capital, present a potential risk of a reversal of flows in a very short-term. The flow 
reversal can create a banking crisis, and result in both exchange rate and interest rate 
volatility. If the State Bank lacks an adequate stock of international reserves to meet 
the outflow, it may cause a balance of payments crisis. 
To assess the exposure of the banking system to the potential capital outflows, 
more relevant than the import cover of reserves, in this context, is the degree to 
which official reserves and the foreign currency balances of banks provide a cushion 
against a reversal of inflows. For this purpose the total potential outflow is estimated 
to be equal to the cumulated flow of portfolios inflows and resident and non-resident 
FCDs plus other short-term capital during the recent period of surge in inflows, e.g. 
1991-91 to 1994-95. Gross official reserves and foreign exchange reserves with the 
commercial  banks need to be  adequate  to meet the potential outflow. Table 9 
shows that the ratio of banking system reserves to cumulate volatile inflows declined 
from 1.27 in 1990-91 to 0.69 in 1992-93 and then remained below 0.8 in subsequent 
years. The same ratio excluding resident FCDs (a component which has displayed 
greater stability in recent years) peaked at 2.89 in 1992-93, but declined to 1.42 in 
1994-95. The ratio of exposure warns of a weak reserve base to support growing 
capital inflows, whose composition is rapidly changing towards the more volatile 
components. 
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Table 9 
Pakistan—Reserves and Inflows ( in Million of US Dollars) 
 1990-91 1991-92   1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Private Capital Inflows 
Short-term      
(Public and Private) 264 –952 980 1143 84 
Resident FCDs 190 1318 543 752 381 
Portfolio –9 219 137 289 1069 
FDI 246 335 306 354 354 
Workers’ Remittances 1848 1488 1562 1446 1800 
Volatile Flows 
(Portf: FCDs, Short–term) 445 585 1660 2184 1534 
Excldg RFCDs 255 –733 1117 1432 1153 
Cumulative Volatile Flows 445 1030 2690 4874 6408 
(Since 1990-91): 
Excldg. RFCDs 255 –478 639 2071 3224 
Official Gross Reserves 572 1038 462 2302 2771 
Commercial Banks 
Foreign Exchange Balances 4 27 1384 1547 1781 
(Nostro Account, E-bills) 
Banking System 
Reserves 576 1065 1846 3849 4552 
Ratio of Exposure – – – – – 
Reserves/Cum. 
Volatile Flows 1.27 1.03 0.69 0.79 0.71 
Excldg. RFCD 2.26 – 2.89 1.86 1.42 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
State Bank Intervention and Risk Allocation 
Regardless of whether foreign capital flows into the market as foreign direct 
investment, equity portfolio investment, bond issuance, or bank borrowing, there is 
an associated increase in bank deposits and reserves. The later can potentially lead to 
an increase in bank lending, unless the local currency deposits/reserves are either 
used to import goods and/or assets, or absorbed by the central bank through its 
sterilisation policy. In the latter case, the composition of domestic financial assets 
and liabilities is altered. In practice, reflecting the response of Pakistan’s policy-
makers and private decision-makers to the surge in inflows, there has been some 
increase in imports, a rise in reserves reflecting attempts by the SBP to sterilise 
inflows, but also an expansion of domestic credit to both government (for budgetary 
support) and to the private sector. 
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To Sterilise or Not 
The evidence presented in the earlier section suggests that at least a part of the 
private capital inflows, especially portfolios flows and short-term non-resident 
foreign currency deposits, may be transitory and could be followed by capital flight. 
A sudden capital outflow of a large magnitude could have serious consequences for 
the banking system and the equity markets in Pakistan. In light of the possibility of a 
flow reversal, there is serious concern associated with the quality of the expansion of 
domestic credit that has taken place. There are some important policy considerations 
which must be taken into account when making a decision, and these are discussed 
in the following. 
When the banking system is sound and efficient, and there is effective 
regulatory and supervisory control over banks, capital flows will not create 
additional risks to the financial system. When extending credit, banks are able to 
anticipate the effect of a reversal of capital flows on the revenues of their borrowers 
(interest rate and exchange rate risks) by pricing loans accordingly, accumulating 
reserves against such loans, and reducing the concentration of their loan portfolios to 
sectors that may be affected by capital flow reversals. 
On the other hand when credit institutions operate in a regulatory 
environment that allows them to misallocate credit and mismanage their balance 
sheets, a distinct possibility in Pakistan, a capital inflow induced expansion of bank 
credit will create further opportunities for banks to expose the financial system to a 
larger risk of financial loss [Liliana and Weisbrod (1994)]. In pursuing a policy f 
nonsterilisation with a weak banking sector, the State Bank runs the risk that it may 
have to provide liquidity, or equity to troubled or insolvent banks. Moreover, in the 
event of a reversal of capital flows, weak banks would become especially 
vulnerable. This would apply to some of the NCBs in Pakistan as well as some 
newly established private banks which have expanded too rapidly. The history of 
bank crises, including a recent crisis, clearly demonstrates how high the costs can be 
of such rescue operations. 
As a preventive measure, the authorities can resort to a policy of sterilisation 
to control domestic credit expansion. The decision to sterilise or not implies a 
decision to concentrate resources in the State Bank versus the commercial bank; in 
practice resources should be channelled to the institutions who can manage those 
funds better. In the case of Pakistan, the choice is clearly in favour of the State Bank. 
However policy-makers cannot ignore the limited effectiveness of sterilisation as a 
monetary instrument in the absence of capital controls and fixed exchange rate and 
also the quasi-fiscal costs of that policy. Furthermore, the policy decisions extend 
beyond the desirability of sterilisation to the benefits and costs associated with 
different methods of sterilisation. 
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Choosing a Method of Sterilisation 
Sterilisation is carried out through the balance sheet of a central bank. The 
central bank can conduct sterilisation either by increasing reserve requirements on 
commercial bank liabilities or by issuing liabilities to nonbanks who cannot use that 
instrument as a vehicle to expand domestic credit. The health of the domestic 
banking system can play an important role in the choice of alternative sterilisation 
methods. The SBP has at its disposal several tools to sterilise the impact of capital 
inflows on the domestic economy, and in particular, on the pace of domestic credit 
expansion. These include: direct instruments, such as increasing reserve require-
ments4 on commercial bank liabilities—and indirect instruments, such as conducting 
open market operations. 
The use of reserve requirements has two important implications. First, to the 
extent that reserves are remunerated below market interest rates,5 they impose a tax 
on bank intermediation by increasing the wedge between interest rates on bank 
deposits and bank loans. Second, they may not be an effective tool for sterilising 
capital inflows that are intermediated by nonbank financial institutions and by the 
capital markets, such as in the case of bond or equity portfolio flows. For instance, in 
Pakistan non-resident FCDs deposited with non-bank financial institutions have 
grown rapidly since June 1993, and now account for over 21 percent of all non-
resident FCDs. 
By increasing the cost of funds to some institutions, sterilisation through 
reserve requirements can place banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
nonbank financial institutions, which often are not subject to the same regulations. 
Over time, bank disintermediation may occur as nonbanks replace banks as a source 
of private credit at more competitive rates. 
Alternatively, the State Bank can conduct open market operations. But there 
are limits to sterilisation conducted through open market operations by the SBP 
imposed by the ability of domestic money markets to absorb the sale of government 
securities or State Bank bills. In addition, there are high and rising quasi-fiscal costs 
to open market operations as domestic short-term interest rates have remained well 
above international rates which the SBP can earn on its reserves. Furthermore, the 
increase in short-term interest rates due to open market operations act as a further 
stimulus to short-term inflows, thus reducing the effectiveness of sterilisation. 
 
Dollarisation and Policy Constraints 
Evidence suggests that the growth of FCDs can be explained as a switch in 
4Reserve requirements were increased by SBP from 5 percent to 6.5 percent and repurchase 
option rate from 15 percent  to 15.5 percent to regulate liquidity during 1994-95. 
5The SBP pays—percent interest on commercial banks’ reserves held with the SBP, compared to 
13 percent interest on 3-year FIB in June 1995. 
Financial Sector Development 873 
the choice of currency denomination by resident investors and in particular 
expatriate workers. In the literature the use of foreign exchange instead of local 
currency as a medium of exchange is referred to as currency substitution while the 
use of foreign exchange as a store of value is commonly referred to as dollarisation. 
Evidently, the growth of FCDs constitutes dollarisation. Apart from the policy issues 
related to the potential flow reversal discussed above, there are some issues 
associated with the effect of dollarisation. For purposes of this paper, dollarisation is 
measured by the ratio of resident FCDs to total domestic liquidity. This ratio 
increased from 2.6 percent in 1991 to about 14 percent currently. Although 
dollarisation is still fairly limited in Pakistan, the increase in financial intermediation 
in recent years is primarily due to the use of foreign currency deposits. The changes 
in the ratio of M2/GDP suggests an increase in financial intermediation, while the 
ratio (M2/RFCDs)/GDP shows the contribution of RFCD towards this (Table 10). 
Foreign currency deposits encourage intermediation of informal sector funds, and 
contribute to financial efficiency. They lower transaction costs, and expands the 
availability of foreign exchange through formal prudentially controlled channels. 
 
Table 10 
Pakistan—Selected Financial Statistics 
(in Billions of Rupees) 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 
Currency in  
Circulation(MI) 136.9 151.8 166.9 184.9 218.2 
Demand and Time 
Deposits 219.2 292.3 334.6 375.3 403.0 
Resident FCDs   9.5  43.0  61.3  92.1  99.9 
Domestic Liquidity (M2) 368.8 480.5 567.2 657.9 734.3 
GDP 1020.6 1211.4 1314.6 1564.6 1866.5 
M1/GDP (Percent) 13.4 12.5 12.4 11.8 11.6 
M2/GDP (Percent) 36.1 39.6 42.3 42.0 39.3 
RFCDs/M2 (Percent) 2.6 8.9 10.8 14.0 13.6 
(M2–RFCDs)/GDP (Percent)  35.3 36.1 37.7 36.2 34.0 
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan; and estimates. 
 
The growing use of foreign currency deposits reduces the inflation tax base 
and lowers the incentive to inflate. It is possible that a higher rate of inflation may 
accelerate the pace of dollarisation. Similarly the authority’s ability to tax domestic 
currency holding through a devaluation is also reduced [Karim 1994)]. 
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Foreign currency deposits thus contribute to a loss of control and 
effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policy tools. The State Bank of 
Pakistan has little control on the foreign currency component of the money supply, 
and it limits the effectiveness of the latter as a tool of demand management. In 
addition the use of FCDs implies the indexation of a part of the money supply to the 
exchange rate, which reduces the expenditure switching impact of the exchange rate. 
In light of this the reliance on fiscal policy becomes even greater in demand 
management. 
 
The Commercial Banks and Capital Inflows 
Capital account liberalisation and bank deregulation in Pakistan led to greater 
access of commercial banks to funds before improvements in regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks were fully implemented and were capable of adequately 
safeguarding against systemic risk. Improvements in prudential regulation were 
introduced by the State Bank in 1992, but regulations specifying the definition of 
bank capital, provisioning requirements for various classes of substandard assets, 




Structural weaknesses in the publicly owned commercial banks that might 
surface during periods of large and volatile capital flows—can be traced, in part, to 
the use of commercial bank loans to achieve government economic policy objectives 
and to interference in the allocation of credit for political reasons. As a result, public 
sector banks have little incentive to properly assess and price their credit risk. In 
addition, because banks can avoid identifying and providing reserves against, 
problem loans, some banks in Pakistan could carry bad loans as performing and 
capitalise unpaid interest. [Since the government guarantees the deposit base in the 
Pakistani banking system, weak bank balance sheets, create the potential for sizeable 
quasi-fiscal costs in case of bank failures.] 
Aggregate bank lending is not currently concentrated in particular economic 
sectors. Concentration of lending should be avoided, since it increases the 
vulnerability of the banking sector, and of the financial system, to sector-specific 
economic developments. 
Public sector institutions have less of an incentive to manage risk properly 
because there is a greater presumption of a public sector bailout of a failed state-
owned institution than of a failed private bank. 
Even in private institutions, internal risk management is inadequate as 
witnessed in the case of a recent private sector bank. The essence of internal control 
is the measurement and assessment of risk exposures (including the creditworthiness 
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of the borrowers and market risk) and the implementation of banking practices that 
make these risks manageable. Poor accounting standards and limited information 
disclosure requirements make the assessment of the riskiness of creditors very 
difficult. Accounting standards are widely perceived as being relatively weak in 
Pakistan. Reliable information is available only for the very large listed companies. 
In many cases, the maintenance of multiple accounts, greatly diminishes the 
reliability of reported information. 
 
Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
The lack of enforcement of existing regulations is a source of problems in 
Pakistan. A minimum requirement of an effectively operating bank is that there is 
independent internal oversight of lending decisions by a credit review committee. 
Such oversight would provide a check against abuses such as lending without proper 
collateral or in excess of credit exposure limits. An equally important contribution of 
the review process is the subsequent follow-up as part of a systematic effort to 
monitor the quality of the loan portfolio. 
The general requirements of a sound prudential regulatory structure include 
the ability of the SBP to examine bank operations and balance sheets, to inject 
liquidity or capital into banks to contain financial crises, to close banks and to 
restrict dividend payments, to issue cease and desist orders, to establish entry criteria 
and capital adequacy rules, to define exposure limits, to delineate and enforce 
permitted and prohibited activities, and to enforce asset classification and 
provisioning rules. An important contribution of bank supervision is to relate the 
true economic value of a bank’s portfolio to the bank’s capital base. Poor accounting 
standards may mean, however, that banks have inadequate information about the 
quality of their loan portfolios, and that even detailed examination by supervisors 
and regulators may not reveal more information. Current regulations governing the 
reporting of asset quality in Pakistan fall short of international practices. 
Amendments in the State Bank Act in 1993, have given the SBP the required degree 
or autonomy to conduct its supervisory and regulatory role effectively. 
To avoid loan losses, bank regulators in Pakistan have imposed limits on bank 
lending in a variety of forms, including liquidity requirements and exposure limits. 
However, such controls are easily circumvented because regulations and accounting 
practices are weak. 
Strong legal and accounting systems are important elements of the regulatory 
support for risk management. In Pakistan the legal framework is being strengthened 
to enhance the effectiveness of bank claims to seize collateral in the event that loans 
are not properly serviced. 
Capital inflows have been encouraged into Pakistan by deregulation 
measures. The potential negative impact they could have on financial institutions  
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should not elicit a response, to try to reverse temporarily the factors that attracted 
foreign capital in the first place. Instead, pressures from foreign capital flows should 
be used to promote deregulation and reforms in the domestic markets. 
 
Impact of Portfolio Flows on the Equity Market 
 
Market Linkages and Price Volatility 
The benefits to Pakistan of greater access to global capital markets include 
lower funding costs as a result of diversification of funding sources, and improved 
liquidity and market depth. However these benefits can be offset by risks associated 
with exposure to turbulence in international markets and by effects of fluctuation in 
capital flows. 
The increased participation of foreign investors can potentially strengthen the 
linkage between local and foreign markets. It can magnify the effect of industrial 
country market turbulence (as experienced in Mexico during the first quarter of 
1994) on the emerging equity markets. Because local investors generally have no 
information about why foreign investors are changing their portfolios, investors will 
tend to react to such moves. Such reactions will magnify the effect of foreign 
turbulence on the local market. 
The presence of foreign investors especially through large mutual funds can 
also increase stock price volatility by magnifying price fluctuations in the local 
market. Outflows are likely to occur when small and illiquid markets are weak. 
Investors tend to redeem their shares from the fund, and fund managers are then 
obliged to sell shares in the local market, which further depresses prices. In this way, 




The rapid increase in foreign demand for emerging market equities combined 
with their relatively limited supply has fuelled sharp increases in equity prices during 
the early 1990s. In Pakistan the rise in stock prices was particularly pronounced 
during 1993 before easing somewhat in 1993, and then again rising sharply in 1994. 
The surge in prices, in turn, contributed to a marked rise in market capitalisation and 
an equally dramatic increase in price-earnings ratios. The market capitalisation 
increased from $ 2.8 billion in 1990 to $ 13.5 billion in 1994 (Table 11). Since 
March 1994, the index of share prices has declined partly due to selling by foreign 
funds in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis. A sudden withdrawal of funds by 
foreign investors has produced variation in market liquidity, which was reflect in 
market volatility. This liquidity effect was large, especially since, the stock 
exchanges in Pakistan are operating without specialists or without securities dealers 
who will use their inventory to provide liquidity and smooth price fluctuations. 
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Table 11 
Pakistan—Stock Market Activity 
     End March 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994 1995 
General Index of  Share Price 100 188.5 161.7 290.2 308.8 204.0 
(Percent Change)  (88.5) (–14.2) (79.5) (91.0) (–29.7) 
Market Capitalisation 
of Ordinary Shares 68.4 218.4 214.4 404.6 424.6 316.9 
(Rs Billion)       
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Accounting and Disclosure Requirements 
One fundamental reason for high price volatility in developing countries like 
Pakistan is a lack of information. When information is uncertain and disclosure is 
inadequate, unsubstantiated rumours cause volatility. Differences in the availability 
and quality of information and the speed of information dissemination can affect the 
impact of sudden changes in portfolio flows on both price and volume volatility. 
Recently, the Karachi Stock Exchange has undertaken various measures to 
modernise its functioning: it has expanded its computer retrieval service and is in the 
process of establishing a central depositing company system. However the stock 
markets in Pakistan are in need of modernisation. 
Although a fairly complete legal and institutional framework is in place, 
implementation and enforcement of regulation relating to investor protection is weak. 
The possibility of insider trading can undermine investors confidence and can be 
detrimental to market development. This contributes to the volatility of prices as well. 
 
Size of Market and Trading Instruments 
The effect that portfolio flows can have on an emerging stock market depends 
importantly on the size of the flow relative to the size of the market, and the capacity 
of the market to quickly process and absorb the number of foreign orders and 
transactions. Portfolio flows at their peak were less than $ 300 million during the 
year or about 2½ percent market capitalisation of $ 13 billion. But these inflows 
were a substantial proportion of the turnover during that year. 
It is often argued that derivative products, due to their highly leveraged 
nature, can also facilitate speculation, which can lead to higher stock market 
volatility and more extreme price movements. The stock markets in Pakistan allow 
margin trading and short-selling, which are other means of obtaining greater 
leverage. In order to check excessive margin trading and short selling, the stock 
exchange could impose limits on aggregate margin and short-selling positions. 
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Finally, the proper design and implementation of clearing and settlement 
systems for stock transactions is essential for maintaining the ability of the emerging 
stock markets to absorb and to allocate financial resources to their most productive 
uses, especially in the presence of large price fluctuations caused by rapid inflows 
and outflows of large amounts of foreign portfolio capital. Automated trading 
systems can reduce transaction costs and improve investors’ participation and market 
liquidity. 
 
V.  EVALUATION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Economic growth during the last two years is recovering gradually from the 
slow down experienced in 1992-93 due to weather, politics and external terms of 
trade developments. At 4.7 percent, the real GDP growth rte in 1994-95 remains 
well below the average of 6 percent during most of the 1980s. The full potential of 
economic growth in the country is constrained mainly by deficiencies in the physical 
infrastructure, harnessed energy resources and in human resource development, 
reflecting years of inadequate investment. Neglect of the social sector during the last 
decade adversely affected living standards, and is now contributing to growing 
social unrest with serious consequences for confidence of private sector investors. 
The requirements for investment resources is large and growing rapidly under 
pressures of population growth and desire for development. The Government’s 
ability to meet development investment is constrained by the need to reduce the large 
fiscal imbalance which together with the recent surge in capital inflows is 
contributing to inflationary pressures and crowding out private sector activity. The 
fiscal deficit at an estimated 5.5 percent of GDP in 1994-95 reflects structural 
rigidities in expenditure and weak revenue growth during the current transitional 
period of an ongoing tax reform. As a consequence, the role of the government is 
undergoing a major transformation; the authorities are continuing with an 
accelerated privatisation programme to generate revenues and the private sector is 
being invited into areas like energy, that were previously public sector domain. Both 
of the latter initiatives involve foreign private sector participation which will result 
in additional capital inflows. 
The external current account deficit at 3.5 percent of GDP in 1994-95, has 
grown slowly in terms of GDP with rising imports and deficit on the services 
account. The current account deficit has been financed by large private capital 
inflows during the last two years which have contributed to the overall balance of 
payments surplus and accumulation of reserves. The import cover of official gross 
foreign exchange reserves is equal to 13.5 weeks of imports. The nominal exchange 
rate of the rupee has remained almost steady against the US dollar through 1994 and 
early 1995. The rupee was devalued by 7.5 percent against the US dollar in late 
October. 
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Monetary expansion has been contained through open market operations 
which have built up a cushion of State Bank reserves and increases in reserve 
requirements and discount rates. Broad money growth has been reduced from 18 
percent in 1992-93 to 16.6 percent in 1994-95. Short-term money market interest 
rates fluctuated widely during 1994 reflecting budgetary needs and capital inflows in 
the market. 
Private capital inflows have grown rapidly during the 1990s, peaking at $ 4.5 
billion in 1993-94 and remained strong at $ 4.4 billion in 1994-95. These inflows 
have eased the foreign exchange constraints of Pakistan, financing a growing current 
account deficit and helping build up large foreign exchange reserves. These large 
inflows have eased concerns about the short-term impact of trade liberalisation; and 
in the case of FDI, participated in the country’s investment efforts. But at the same 
time, private capital inflows have contributed to demand pressures and set up a 
systemic risk to the banking sector. The coverage of that portion of inflows which is 
estimated to be volatile, remains less than 75 percent. The volatility of portfolio 
flows has taken its toll of price fluctuations in the country’s stock markets. However, 
by and large, the major portion of capital flows are of a stable nature and are 
expected to continue growing along trend. These are likely to be complemented by 
inflows related to the sale of public corporation shares in international markets and 
investments in the energy sectors. 
Looking ahead, the Government will need to respond in a manner that will 
accommodate the higher investment and growth afforded by the inflows while 
curbing their destabilising effects. 
Box 3 
Lessons from the Mexican Crisis in Managing Capital Flows 
Recent development in Mexico have brought into sharper relief the differences in the composition 
and management of private capital flows between different regions of the world. These differences have 
important implications for future flows to these region and for policies for managing the flows. 
For example, East Asian countries maintained more stable macro-economic environment during 
periods of large inflows, which was more favourable to sustain high growth. East Asia also maintained 
high annual saving and investment rates as compared to countries in Latin America. Higher investment in 
East Asia was financed primarily with domestic resources. Inflows into East Asia have tended to increase 
investment rather than consumption while some Latin American countries experienced a consumption 
boom. East Asian export growth has been stronger, signalling a better future capacity to service foreign 
liabilities in contrast to Latin American countries, where inflows outpaced the growth of exports. East 
Asia provided investors and exporters a more stable financial environment reflected in lower inflation and 
a lower variability of inflation and real exchange rates than in Latin America, while protecting external 
competitiveness. In several Latin American countries real exchange rates appreciated and the erosion of 
competitiveness was associated with rapidly widening current account deficits. In general East Asian 
countries also made greater use of fiscal restraint in coping with inflows. 
The lesson for Pakistan is that stronger economic fundamentals and sound macro-economic 
responses to large capital inflows increases the likelihood that these inflows would be sustained, and less 
vulnerable to volatility. Pakistan must move quickly to reduce the budget deficit and restrain monetary 
expansion. Measures should be taken to avoid appreciation of the real exchange rate and competitiveness 
maintained to expand export. 
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Among steps to increase the absorptive capacity of the economy to stimulate 
investment and growth, three areas need urgent attention: the first is the ability of the 
banking system to intermediate a large increase in credit efficiently; the second is to 
ensure adequacy of physical infrastructure; and the third is to proceed with the trade 
reform to ensure efficient allocation of large inflows throughout the economy. 
 
Financial Sector Reform 
The need to remove remaining distortions in the financial sector and 
weaknesses in banking supervision and prudential standards, has taken on added 
urgency as a result of the surge in inflows. To address the issues of exchange risks 
and general loan risks, regulations to ensure adequacy of capital bases and limit 
banks exposure to foreign exchange risk are essential. Pakistan should adopt capital 
adequacy standards in accordance with guidelines under the Basle accord. Details of 
specific measures needed in the area of accounting, information etc. are discussed in 
Section IV. Financial sector reforms are needed not only to reduce the risk of bank 
failures if there is a reversal of inflows, but also to improve intermediation to take 
full advantage of the increased inflows. 
 
Infrastructure 
The need for developing infrastructure to accommodate higher investment 
stemming from inflows may seem to conflict with the desire to reduce the fiscal 
deficit. To reduce the conflict, the Government has invited private sector 
participation in development of the power sector. Other areas for private sector 
participation should be explored. In addition, fiscal adjustment can rely on other 
areas of the budget for savings to reduce the deficit. 
 
Trade Reform 
The initial motivation for trade reforms, to improve economic efficiency, has 
become more important as large inflows need to be allocated throughout the 
economy to the most productive activities. Moreover the inflows have eased any 
perceived constraints on the speed of trade liberalisation and tariff reduction. 
The Government needs to continue with efforts to contain demand pressures 




Sterilisation is most effective when accompanied by fiscal restraint. This is 
the preferred policy mix of Pakistan. Some degree of sterilisation will help further 
build up foreign exchange reserves with the State Bank to increase the cover against  
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volatile outflows. It will contain domestic credit expansion through a banking system 
which is currently weak and unable to assess, price and manage risk associated with 
volatile inflows. It is likely to be effective as a tool of monetary policy since the 
majority of inflows are evidently insensitive to interest rate developments in 
Pakistan. 
Total reliance on sterilisation to contain domestic demand will not be 
advisable. First, sterilisation carries a quasi-fiscal cost which will grow over-time. 
Second, sterilisation deflects inflows into purchases of government bonds and raises 
interest rates, thus depriving the economy of the benefits of inflows—higher 
domestic investment and growth. 
Open market operations should be used more often as a tool for sterilisation 
since it places less of a burden on the banking sector. For this purpose, the State 
Bank should issue its own paper to supplement its portfolio of T-bills. 
 
Fiscal Policy 
An increase in public sector savings seems to be the only sustainable policy to 
contain demand pressures and protect the real exchange rate. To the extent that some of 
the inflows into Pakistan stem from an unsustainable policy mix, (tight credit with an 
easier fiscal policy) reducing the fiscal deficit will eliminate the problem at source. 
However in view of the need to protect the public sector investment 
programme, especially the development of the infrastructure, the form of fiscal 
adjustment will need to be carefully considered. First, fiscal adjustment should aim 
to reduce demand for non-traded goods and services e.g. reduction in the wage bill, 
which reduces domestic inflationary pressures (rather than cutting expenditures on 
imported goods which will add pressures for exchange rate appreciation). Second, 
expenditure restraint will have a stronger impact on domestic demand than revenue 
increases because the latter absorb resources that might have been saved. Third, 
notwithstanding structural rigidities in fiscal expenditures, there is need to reduce 
waste, and corruption and to improve governance to increase the productivity and 
effectiveness of public expenditure. 
 
Exchange Rate Policy and Capital Account 
Net capital inflows can be reduced by liberalising capital outflows through the 
capital account, and by increasing the exchange risk faced by participants in the 
market. The latter can be achieved by enlarging the band within which the exchange 
rate can move. Permitting some flexibility, increases the exchange rate risk for 
foreign investors. 
Mohammad Zubair Khan 882 
Annex 1 
FOREIGN CURRENCY ACCOUNTS SCHEME IN PAKISTAN 
 
The Scheme 
Foreign currency accounts scheme, which was introduced in January, 1973, 
was initially meant for Pakistani nationals residing abroad. The scope of the scheme 
was gradually widened. Permission to Pakistani residents to open and maintain these 
accounts and general permission for credit to these accounts was granted as part of 
the overall package of foreign exchange reforms announced in February, 1991. 
Presently, banks may, without the prior approval of the State Bank, open with them 
foreign currency accounts of Pakistani Nationals residing in or outside Pakistan 
including those having a dual nationality. Resident firms and resident companies 
including investment banks and the companies incorporated in Pakistan with foreign 
share-holdings are also eligible to open and maintain foreign currency accounts in 
Pakistan. The facility is also available to diplomatic missions accredited to Pakistan, 
their Diplomatic Officers, International Organisations in Pakistan, foreign firms/ 
corporations other than banks incorporated and operating abroad provided these are 
owned by persons who are otherwise eligible to open foreign currency accounts. 
The balances held in foreign currency accounts and income therefrom are 
exempt from the levy of Wealth Tax, Income Tax, and compulsory deduction of 
Zakat at source. Banks can also grant rupee loans to the account-holders, to a certain 
extent of their balances and can also issues guarantees on their behalf in favour of 
residents/non-residents. State Bank covers exchange risk of all such deposits against 
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